The Myth of Russia and Ukraine http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/26/russia-ukraine-yushchenko-hug

As I indicated at that link and elsewhere:

Post-Soviet polls in Ukraine consistently show that a good portion of Ukraine’s population seek closer and friendlier ties with Russia. How would an authoritative poll in Ukraine measure Putin’s popularity with Yushchenko’s?

The author is correct that it’s wrong to see the Ukrainian situation in just Russia-West terms. It’s also inaccurate to downplay the Russocentric sentiment in Ukraine. There’s a reason why Tymoshenko didn’t criticize the Russian counterattack against the Georgian government. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate remains the largest religious denomination in Ukraine. Russian language use in Ukraine remains high. Ditto opposition to Ukraine joining NATO.

I don’t see where highlighting a “East-West rivalry” over Ukraine plays more into Russia’s hands. It can be reasonably argued that such a stance plays more into the hands of Western neolibs and neocons, as per the stated views of people like Aslund and Brzezinski.

The monitoring of the last Ukrainian presidential election left something to be desired. Orange leaning Western observers monitored Yanukovych strong holds in a way that wasn’t the same in Orange popular areas. Besides the CIS observers, Rachel Ehrenfeld was part of an Israeli delegation which monitored the vote there. The now defunct British Helsinki Human Rights Group observed as well. These mentioned observers offer compelling evidence of less than non-partisan accounting done on the part of the Orange leaning Western observers.

Be wary of measuring a popular view solely on the size of a street demonstration. This relates to the “silent majority” term. The less popular Russia unfriendly position in Ukraine compensates with a comparatively greater activism, whereas the more Russia friendly view there seems to take things for granted.

Having said all this, I think Ukraine stands a very good chance of remaining in tact. An issue like this isn’t etched in stone. Hence the hypothesizing which can lead to some interesting thoughts.

Regarding Ukraine, it has been said that some forces in the east of that country don’t seek a breakup of Ukraine, because in the long run, they feel that the eastern view can eventually get the upper hand in a united Ukraine. Awhile back in the Kyiv Post, a west Ukrainian author called for an independent west Ukrainian state consisting of Bukovina, Galicia and Transcarpathia. I sensed from the article that he has in mind what I note in the beginning of this paragraph.

I once again note how no Russian republic is currently seeking to leave Russia, while a number of territories outside of Russia would no doubt seek to rejoin it. The Czech Republic, Lithuania and western Ukraine show no present signs of seeking to become part of a Polish dominated entity. Even if they were to come together, I don’t see this as a defeat against a hypothetical union consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, much of Ukraine and perhaps some others. If the latter were to occur, why should it collapse as per GF? Its coming together would no doubt be based on the “where there’s unity, there’s strength” view.

I’d have to check back for specifics on PZ. As you might agree, much of the negativity on Russia is due to seemingly ingrained (often subconscious) prejudices of a wishful thinking type.

Using Tom Friedman as a quality control measurement of foreign policy analysis isn’t IMO appropriate for the reasons expressed at this thread. Stratfor has been a propped source. That is compares favorably to TF should be seen in relativist terms.

Post 2

When comparing the mentioned hypothetical Russian and Polish zones of influence, Russia seems to have a better inside track. In the Ukrainian instance, one can find views supporting a union with Russia. Similar support for a Polish-Ukrainian union is comparatively limited.

It’s true that there’s historical issues between Poland / West Ukrainian, which will hinder any overt Polish attempt to reassert itself in the region. However like France / Germany my impression is that they’ve mostly overcome their differences and are becoming increasingly economically integrated. This cultural and economic interchange could eventually lead to integrative tendencies, especially if the eastern “weight” of Ukraine breaks off into Russia’s orbit. And if as GF posits the remade Russian empire collapses in the 2020′s, there’ll be a security vacuum in eastern Europe, which will pull in Poland from the west (and Turkey from the south).

Argentina never really had any prospects. It is very isolated, overshadowed by a more powerful Brazil and demographically small (about 40mn people, same as Poland). It’s main task is just to become rich per capita, in which department it certainly has been a disappointment, being one of the very rare examples of a country that went from being developed to developing since WW2.

I think Peter Zeihan is more skeptical of the reemergence of a Russian empire than Friedman. When I searched his name I came across a Stratfor article about how Europe is apparently outmaneuvering Russia on the energy front (unconvincingly, he argues that Europe is going to successfully reduce its dependence on Russian gas whereas all other serious analyses forecast the dependency growing in the medium term).

@False Dmitry,

I dislike Thomas L. Friedman too, but more for the fact that he successfully sells millions of over-hyped, insipid books with no significant or original insight. That gaudy, pretentious site of his you link to reflects him very well.

http://www.thomaslfriedman.com/

an imperial troubadour whose job is to peddle the official agenda and thus remain near the sun which in turn allow him to promote himself, his books and his friends.

Lithuanians and west Ukrainians aren’t looking to become part of Poland. Overall, I haven’t found them to have a particular fondness of their past as part of a Polish dominated entity. On the other hand, Pridnestrovie and South Ossetia voted to reunite with Russia. Some other areas currently outside Russia would probably do the same if given the choice. As for Russia itself, no one is presently seeking to leave it. Over the past several years, Russia has ranked as one of the leading countries taking in new arrivals.

On the topic of predicting the future, Argentina has been a big disappointment. At one time, it wasn’t so off the wall to believe that it would be a major force.

I share some of your general thoughts about GF. In comparison, I recollect Peter Zeihan of Stratfor as someone who (IMO) expresses the more questionable of views on former Communist bloc issues.

Tom Humes