http://www.amazon.de/Von-Katjuscha-zur-Kursk-Russische/dp/3897068834/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1274881848&sr=1-1

Preiss and his colleague Egbert Lemcke at the DSS in Dresden belong to the best analysts of Russian military affairs outside of the motherland.

http://www.deagel.com/news/Russian-T-90-Tanks-to-Receive-Catherine-FC-Thermal-Cameras_n000002627.aspx

Yes, one of the most visible problems with the Russian MIC is that they don’t get past the prototype stage into serial production. But, I believe this phase of weapons development is very important and directly contributes to the quality of the technology itself through incremental improvements and lessons learned from operational experiences. It also serves as proof of the prototype’s capability.

I did read the Air Power Australia article when you first posted your review. One thing to watch out for in Western assessments of Russian or Chinese military technology is the scare-mongering angle. Western observers often hype foreign military capabilities to either 1) represent foreign nations as a belligerent and militaristic and therefore advocate a hostile foreign policy, or 2) to promote increased military budgets and support specific military projects.

The classic example of #2 are Western military commentators hyping the new Flankers in order to justify lifting export restrictions and spending almost $200 million a piece buying F-22s. I believe the real objective of the AAP article is to advocate Australia’s purchase of the F-22 and therefore Russian aircraft technology short-comings are downplayed to help the argument.

Finally, I would be careful in using announced projects and prototypes in state-of-technology comparisons. For example, as far as I know, the MiG Skat, which got a lot of publicity online in 2007, is nothing more than a full-size mock-up, not even a proof of concept or a prototype. It wouldn’t be fair to claim parity to the MQ-1 and MQ-9 UCAV technology (the state of the art) which have been battlefield assets for several years now.

http://www.janes.com/articles/International-Defence-Review-2007/RSK-MiG-exhibits-its-first-stealthy-UCAV.html

This lag in state of Russian military technology will likely worsen unless the state finds a way to channel more funds into defense enterprises.

2. There is certainly no preferential access to labor resources. Maybe something is going on with natural resources and other inputs under the covers, but it’s besides the point. MIC is mostly exported oriented, so it has nothing to do with Russia’s own military expenditures. It’s military consumption that affects economic well-being, not military production. For example, Georgia doesn’t produce hardly anything military, but such a peace-loving state ended spending over 10% of their GDP on military officially, not even counting gifts, leading up to their brilliantly executed S.Ossetian adventure.

3. How would that work? We know that either the army or importers pay for the hardware with real money. We know that there is no unaccounted Russian military hardware lying around. We know that prices charged are roughly market. So where did the money go? And if there is hidden production, it has to show up somewhere, right?

As for dual purpose stuff, virtually anything can have military significance. We need to stop somewhere. If units are used for law enforcement, they are law enforcement. After all, they’re not sitting idle in peacetime, like the army. And if they aren’t, that means they are producing some service that is consumed in peacetime. Or this might end up like one of my old arguments with some idiot who insisted that the entire Komsomol membership be counted as part of Soviet military strength in 1941 because, apparently, they were a military organization. For some reason he objected to counting Boy Scouts as part of the American military. Go figure.

Obviously that hasn’t happened, since most of Russia’s oil money has been a) wasted on oligarchs, b) used to sustain consumer imports or c) sequestered by the government in foreign bonds whose value will soon be inflated away.

That is not to imply that re-armament isn’t going to happen, however.

Re-weapons. Russia has fielded many advanced technologies in prototypes, the main issue now being to embark on large-scale production. As an example, I highly recommend this article on Assessing Russian Fighter Technology, which concludes:

In conclusion, the notion that contemporary production Russian fighters are inferior in technology, performance and overall capability to their US/EU peers is largely not correct, and predicated on assumptions about Russian technological capabilities which ceased to be true a decade or more ago. The disdain toward the Flanker shown by many senior bureacrats in Western defence establishments reflects, sadly, nothing more than their lack of insight and understanding as to how far the Russians have progressed since 1991 in a globalised high technology economy.

Much the same goes for most of the other points. It’s slowness in adapting to the next big things (advances in C&C, surveillance, etc) is understandable given its conservatism, but again that isn’t to imply nothing is happening on this front. E.g. even re-drones, see MiG Combat Drone Revealed (Skat).

The main problem is not with technology adaptation or R&D, but actually fielding these technologies on a large scale to transform the military forces. Rosefielde’s and Stratfor’s theses are that this is going to begin in a big way from the early 2010′s, and on current economic / political trends this is a valid point of view to take, IMO.

However, I agree with your characterizations of the problems of the MIC (which is something I’ve indirectly alluded to by my noting how its non-R&D sectors have degenerated). Though a lot of resources are locked up in it, they are currently largely dormant and inefficiently utilized, with high levels of corruption. My impression is that Putvedev’s plan is to a) consolidate / rationalize the MIC, and b) split it in two branches – one will remain a military sector (similar to the Soviet one, downsized in scale – though still huge, but more effective due to imported modern management, easier technology diffusion and access to indigenous markets), and another will transition to the civilian sector (the Sukhoi SuperJet would be a good example of that).

I never claimed (or thought) your assessment is Russophobic. This post is totally divorced from the Russophobia / Russophilia debate.

1. Black budgets and fiscal accounting fudging and distortions (this is prevalent even in the US).
2. Economic distortions to provide the MIC with preferential access to physical and labor resources. This has obviously declined with the end of the Soviet Union, but it hasn’t ended.
3. The continued role of physical-systems networks not reflected in the fiscal or monetary system.

The only question, I think, is what percentage is visible and what percentage is hidden.

Re-exports. They would still count as part of Russia’s GDP by any definition because they are a) a “goods” output and b) an export.

Re-”law enforcement”. That is certainly a weakness in this book. On the other hand it is not really clear whether some paramilitary forces have more to do with law enforcement or military tasks. They are dual-purpose.