In more practical terms, it is simply much easier to integrate peoples of your own or similar cultural background so that they “pay pension contributions and taxes”.

Still, integration problems with Gasterbeiter are a world away from the world of rapid demographic (and economic, military, etc) decline painted by serious analysts like Eberstadt, not to mention less-serious writers like Steyn.

My goal was to refute their ultra-pessimistic scenarios – not to claim that Russia won’t face any demographic challenges.

The Armenian numbers do give one pause. Armenia has around three milllion people, very low TFRs, and negative population growth before emigration. These figures say that nearly one percent of Armenia’s population emigrated to Russia in 2007 and then *more* than one percent emigrated in 2008. If those figures are accurate, that’s just completely unsustainable. The supply of Armenians will dry up, and soon.

– I used to live in Armenia. Yerevan and a couple of other large towns have been growing; the rest of the country is indeed emptying out, to the cities and to emigration. An Armenian town that had 1,000 people in the 1980s may have half that number today, or less, and those mostly old people and children. The countryside has already emptied out; there aren’t many more people to send.

Doug M.

But I think we may be talking past each other a little.

You’re justifying your 300,000 figure. No need! I think 300,000 is plausible, and I could hear arguments for more. I have no problem with that part.

But I think you’re handwaving the provenance issue. I think it /is/ possible to make a good guess where they’ll come from. Odds are, it’ll be pretty much exactly where they’re coming from now.

In fact, I’d make a side bet with you. I’d bet that in 2015, most immigration to Russia will still be coming from Central Asia, Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine. That’s been stable for a decade now: the gross numbers have fallen and then rebounded, but the mix hasn’t changed much.

The issue that I see is, most of these people will be gastarbeitern. Their legal status will be “guest worker, present on sufferance”. They may to some extent assimilate, but they will neither integrate nor naturalize.

In the short run — up to 2020 or so — this is no big deal. Having gastarbeitern as ~3-5% of your population is actually pretty common in the developing world.

But the general experience seems to be that, as that number approaches double digits, serious tensions start to appear. And that’s what your model seems to be predicting, well before 2050.

Doug M.

I haven’t done any detailed work on where migrants are going to come from. IMO, given the vast range of possible scenarios, it is probably a waste of time. Consider the following:

1) Russia’s economic growth falters and many Central Asian migrants go back home, where they have better opportunities. If Russia gets zero net migration, then by 2025 its population will be around 5-6mn lower than otherwise, and around 15-20mn lower than otherwise by 2050 (substantial, though not catastrophic by itself). I do not view this as too likely since A) I think objective factors indicate that Russia is likely to catch up to developed nations within the next two decades, B) when European growth rates slowed down during the 1980′s-90′s their Gastarbeiters nonetheless stayed and even brought their families over, and C) during 2009, when Russia’s GDP contracted by 7.9%, net migration remained essentially flat. Finally, I very much doubt any Central Asian country will offer anywhere near Russian living standards any time soon.

2) Russia continues developing more or less along the trajectory seen from after 1998, and becomes “developed” by 2020-25. In that case, it can compete for workers from further abroad – including from nations like Vietnam, India, etc – on equal terms with Western Europe or the US. Any reduction in Central Asian migration is counterbalanced by this migration, so the 300k / annum scenario applies.

3) The West goes into a huge economic contraction due its fiscal overstretch; Russia fares well as peak oil, rising food demand, and global warming lead to A) high energy revenues, B) massive expansion of agriculture, and C) the Arctic north becoming a major trade hub between Europe and East Asia as the ice melts. In a few more decades, rising numbers of “climate refugees” from places like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, etc. In this scenario, migratory inflows could theoretically go into the millions or even tens of millions by 2050. Of course in this scenario of globalized anarchy and collapse, concerns over long-term demography won’t be near the top of any nation’s agenda…

Do we have numbers on the provenance of Russia’s immigrants?

Yes. Use Google Translate on these stats.

My impression is that most of the Caucasus republics are entering a period of rapid aging and demographic contraction — which, while troublesome in many respects, probably bodes well for political stability.

The Muslim Caucasus republics are all very young and have only recently had their fertility rates fall to (slightly) below replacement levels. They won’t experience demographic contractions for a very long time.

1) where your immigrants where be coming from,

2) what ethnicity they’ll be, and

3) what their long-term status will be — legal or illegal, permanent or temporary, naturalized citizen or remaining a noncitizen.

My tentative impression is that your answers are “mostly Central Asia”, “doesn’t much matter” and… well, it’s not clear to me what your thoughts are on (3).

I suspect you’ve gone into more detail; I’m just curious as to how much.

You’re modeling ~300k immigrants per year, plus their children. That by itself doesn’t seem implausible. But there’s a big difference between hundreds of thousands of one-way immigrants who are on a fast track to assimilate and naturalize, and hundreds of thousands of culturally and ethnically distinct guest workers with little or no attachment to the Russian state.

By way of comparison, Greece is coming up against much this issue. The Papandreou government is proposing a path to naturalization and citizenship for (some) children of (some) immigrants. This is based on a recognition that Greece’s current situation — in which 10% of its population and nearly 20% of its workforce consists of non-Greek guest workers with no path to citizenship — is probably not long-term sustainable. On the other hand, adopting a naturalization model is going to be culturally and socially difficult, even if the government manages to force it past the inevitable nationalist backlash.

Anyway: just wondering if you wanted to flesh this out a little.

regards,

Doug M.

Immigration: do I understand right, then, that most of these immigrants will not be ethnic Russians? Mostly Central Asians, yes? (The Caucasus I would say is about tapped out — Armenia, for instance, has already sent about all the people to Russia it possibly can.) And possibly some Ukrainians? Do we have numbers on the provenance of Russia’s immigrants?

Also, is it realistic to assume several million /immigrants/? As opposed to temporary gastarbeitern? Because even in Armenia — an Orthodox (sort of) country with a long tradition of Russophilia — relatively few Armenians head for Moscow intending never to return. Some do end up emigrating, true — but the more common pattern is to stay for years, but then to move back to Armenia. Very few take marry Russians or take Russian citizenship. I suspect this is typical across much of the Near Abroad.

ISTM that immigration is a pretty important component of your model. No? So, I’m trying to understand the underlying assumptions.

You are right to say that many western European societies are attracting more immigrants. But I don’t think that France, German or Britain are good models for Russia in this regard.

Muslim republics: I’m trying to get a feel here for how many disgruntled young men there will be in, say, Kabardino-Balkaria between now and 2025. My impression is that most of the Caucasus republics are entering a period of rapid aging and demographic contraction — which, while troublesome in many respects, probably bodes well for political stability. Chechnya seems to be the worrisome exception, with birthrates falling but still positive. Do I have this right?

Doug M.

Re-1) There is a constant annual influx of 300k migrants in both “medium” scenarios I mention here, so that would be approximately 5mn until 2025 – plus whatever they contribute in fertility minus mortality over that period (overall, positively, because the model has their ages mostly clustering around 20-40 years, as is borne out by real life).

Re-2) That is true, – almost all Russians that will ever come back, did so in the 1990′s, and there was a fall in immigration by the early 2000′s. But in recent years there has been a substantial uptick back to 240k / annum in 2007-2008 as Russia’s cultural attraction to Russians has been replaced by an economic magnetism to workers from the Near Abroad, especially the Caucasus and Central Asia. So in the longer term, assuming Russia continues to be economically attractive to its former “colonies” (or even further abroad), and assuming no major discontinuities like Aleksandr Belov coming to power, I do not think a 300k / annum figure is unrealistic. It might well rise higher, since most West European nations accept a far higher share of migrants as a % of the population.

Re-3) To run this model on individual Muslim republics I will need year-by-year data on their age structure for a recent year. So no, I haven’t. (Furthermore, doing this by specific ethnicity is even harder because Chechens, for instance, don’t only live in Chechnya, but also have a big diaspora throughout Russia, which will probably have different fertility patterns from Chechens in Chechnya). I fully agree with you that it is self-evident that the Muslim % share of the Russian population will increase due to the inertia effect, but overall they will nonetheless remain very much a minority.