There are actually many “flavors” of peak oil theory. The “pure” version is based on Hubbert Linearization, you can read an article on a simplified form of the mathematics behind it here. Looking at things from this perspective, I agree with you that it is “a bit dubious to be looking at decline in production during a time of serious economic contraction and coupling it with peak oil”.

However, other peak oil theorists have noted that due to real world factors, the downslope of a Hubbert curve may be much steeper than the upslope, due to factors such as: 1) financial collapse leading to reduced credit availability, 2) political and geopolitical factors, such as oil-exporter hoarding or wars in the Middle East, which can drastically reduce the efficacy of post-peak oil extraction, and 3) some half dozen or so other major factors. This more holistic approach would consider the 2008-09 financial collapse and near-missed Great Depression 2.0 to be part and parcel of the “peak oil” phenomenon.

I admit to being surprised by the growth in Russia’s oil production in 2009; I actually thought they were serious about cooperating with OPEC. Still, this doesn’t disprove “peak oil” theory for Russia, since the modelers suggest its peak production date would be / could have been any time between 2008 and 2015 (medium – 2011).

Two major evolutions will dominate 2010. The first is a continuation of a trend STRATFOR has been following for years: Russia’s resurgence as a major power. In the 1990s the United States became very comfortable with the idea of Russian weakness, and in the 2000s the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have utterly consumed U.S. military capacity. With the recent decision to send even more forces into Afghanistan, the U.S. preoccupation with the Islamic world will become all-consuming, allowing Russia to do as it pleases in its near abroad.

For Russia, 2010 will be a year of consolidation — the culmination of years of careful efforts. In the coming year, Russia will excise the bulk of what Western and Turkish influence remains from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and try to lay the groundwork for the reformulation of a political union in much of the former Soviet space. That project will not be completed in 2010, but by year’s end it will be obvious that the former Soviet Union is Russia’s sphere of influence and that any effort to change that must be monumental if it is to succeed.

Contributing to the Russian consolidation is a sharpening crisis in the Middle East. Israel believes that Iran’s nuclear program has matured sufficiently to constitute a material threat to the survival of the Jewish state. International diplomatic efforts to contain that program are not simply intended to forestall a future nuclear threat from Iran, but also to prevent an Israeli strike on Iran — a strike that could quickly spiral into a general melee in the world’s premier energy artery, the Persian Gulf.

The mix of players and motives — Israel insisting on real controls and willing to act unilaterally, Iran evading real controls and retaining its ability to act decisively in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia seeking to keep the conflict brewing in order to distract all from its efforts in the former Soviet Union, and the United States simply wanting everyone to calm down so it can focus on its wars — all but guarantees that a crisis will erupt in 2010. The only questions are whether that crisis will be limited to “simply” the Persian Gulf, and whether it will be military in nature.