That test is just stupid, although not yet as bad as Lysenko. Znamya was a real attempt at engineering by the Russians.

There's a saying in German: "Not seeing the wood because of all the trees." <img src="http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/forum/my-plugins/bb-smilies/default/icon_wink.gif" title=":wink:" class="bb_smilies" />
You think very very big, engineering the whole earth with unknown consequences. Have you ever thought small like engineering the climate in one room, one building, one block, one city, one area? You mostly need the climate in the lowest 2m to adjust to what you think suitable. Rich nations will be more capable of doing what is necessary(and many like Canada or Russia will say "What for?") and who gets in trouble because he can't engineer, well, is dead or buys protection with concessions. This future will open far better perspectives for colonialism by great powers because people will need them for survival. And localizing climate control gives the owner power over the people, while some kind of worldwide control regime is counterproductive to world conquest because you cease all that megalomanic power to some supernational treehugger organization (possibly even part of this US-European rigged UN)
Currently, we have lots of experience with small scale climate engineering in living space as well as agriculture. Another seemingly important capability is that growing plants can be dislocated from fields into a highly artificial environments. And last but not least, we're just starting to grow stuff in the oceans and some more heat will speed up the thing.
Sure, there's something called nature, in Russia it will grow, on the equator a possible future seems doubtful and I bet there'll be an even larger replacement with crop growing.
Btw. wasn't the Russian znamya satellite an attempt to speed up the warming of Siberia because the Russians don't want to wait for climate change? <img src="http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/forum/my-plugins/bb-smilies/default/icon_smile.gif" title=":-)" class="bb_smilies" />

And I have a new idea to save the world and destroy all nukes. I think, you know solar pumped lasers. Well, my idea is creating solar pumped high energy storage devices. If they have a fast emission like laser they'll turn out weapons (replacing nukes and the like because you can direct their emission for more efficient destruction), if you can slow the process down it'll be reactors to power machines for a very long time. The best place to load these things is the stratosphere above the South Pole during the polar day. So in case we have an Armageddon with these things we don't have to worry about radioactive contamination and will have the biggest economic boom ever. <img src="http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/forum/my-plugins/bb-smilies/default/icon_twisted.gif" title=":twisted:" class="bb_smilies" />

PS. Two tidbits I'd like to share on the topic of AGW.

Climate change: No hiding place? (Economist)

The betting is that 2010 will be the hottest year on record. But understanding how the planet’s temperature changes is still a challenge to science

IT MAY seem implausible at the moment, as northern Europe, Asia and parts of America shiver in the snow, but 2010 may well turn out as the hottest year on record. Those who doubt that greenhouse gases are quite the problem they have been cracked up to be by most of the world’s climatologists have taken comfort from the fact that the Hadley Centre, part of Britain’s Meteorological Office, reckons the warmest year since records began was 1998 (see chart 1). Twelve years without a new record would, the sceptics reckon, be rather a large lull in what is supposed to be a rising trend. Computer modelling by the Met Office, though, gives odds-on chances of the lull being broken.
...
Indeed, one reason for thinking that the coming year will be hotter than all known previous ones is that the tropical Pacific is currently dumping heat. This phenomenon, by which heat that has been stored up in the sea over the previous few years is released into the atmosphere, is known as El Niño. A strong Niño contributed to the record temperatures in 1998. In 2007 and 2008 the opposite phenomenon, a cooling Niña, was happening. That goes some way to explaining why those years were chilly by the standards of the 2000s.

And on top of El Niño, there is the sun. The sun’s brightness fluctuates over an 11-year cycle. Though the fluctuation is not vast, it is enough to make a difference from peak to trough. In 2009 the sun was at the bottom of its cycle. Unless it is behaving particularly strangely, it should, over the next 12 months, begin to brighten.
...
DePreSys is an attempt to work round this “initialisation” problem—to give the model’s caricature not just an all-purpose resemblance to the way the real climate behaves, but one that captures its pose and expression at a particular moment. In 2007 the first study using DePreSys correctly predicted that there would be a few more years which would set no records. After this, it said, there would be a definite rise in temperature. More recently, Dr Smith and his team have been using clusters of computers around Britain to run multiple models with slightly different initial conditions. Four-fifths of these runs suggest 2010 will be warmer than any previous year—which could be taken as odds of four-to-one on. The techniques are still in their infancy. But they are at least making predictions that can be checked.

Then there's the startling revelation that 2009 may have been the joint-2nd warmest year on record, even despite that solar radiation is at its cyclical minimum.

If It’s That Warm, How Come It’s So Damned Cold?

The past year, 2009, tied as the second warmest year in the 130 years of global instrumental temperature records, in the surface temperature analysis of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS). The Southern Hemisphere set a record as the warmest year for that half of the world. Global mean temperature, as shown in Figure 1a, was 0.57°C (1.0°F) warmer than climatology (the 1951-1980 base period). Southern Hemisphere mean temperature, as shown in Figure 1b, was 0.49°C (0.88°F) warmer than in the period of climatology.

Thanks for contributing this, TG. My thoughts:

1. The IPCC was indeed very wrong on this one, the original work having been done in the Kotlyakov report (1996) which gave the date of 2350 for the disappearance of most of the Himalayan glaciers.

2. These kinds of non-apocalyptic timescales are backed by another, more recent report, An assessment of the potential impacts of climatic warming on glacier-fed river flow in the Himalaya (2006) by Rees & Collins.

A regional hydro-glaciological model has been developed to assess the potential impacts of climatic warming on glacier-fed river flows in the Indus and Ganges basins. The model, applied at a 20 km x 20 km grid resolution, considers glaciers contributing runoff to a cell as a single idealized glacier that is allowed to recede through time. Using 1961-1990 climate data as input, baseline flow estimates were derived for every stretch of river in either basin. A transient warming scenario of +0.06°C years-1 was then imposed for 100 years from an arbitrary start-date of 1991. Comparison of results at 10 sites in two representative areas suggest the impacts of such climatic warming are similar regionally, with estimates of future decadal mean flows continually increasing at 1-4% per decade, relative to baseline, at most sites considered. Flows peaked at only two of the sites several decades into the model run.

3. The worst affected region by far in the event of glacier meltdown would be the Indus (and Pakistan), which is almost entirely reliant on glacier runoff; the other great Asian rivers derive a great deal of their flow from the monsoon, so presumably agricultural civilization will be able to survive in the non-Pakistani parts of the Indian subcontinent as long as a) the monsoons continue, b) irrigation is practiced, c) new rice varieties are developed that are able to cope with increased heat stress, and d) said areas don't fall into so-called "zones of uninhabitability,

4. That said, I should still stress that there are far more unknowns than knowns in all this. Some possibilities that might make the dire predictions of meltdown by around 2050 more plausible:
a) Not a lot of research done, AFAIK, on the brown soot and particulates deposited by Indian cook-fires and industrializing China on the Himalayas, which when embedded in the ice massively accelerate melting since they are "black bodies" (even though ironically they shield the Himalayas from some of the heat).
b) Referring to the report in 2): I'm not sure representing melting glaciers contributing runoff to a cell as a "single idealized glacier" is very rigorous. There could be runaway mechanisms similar to the ones recently discovered for Greenland and Antarctic (i.e. moulins).

5. Though the 2035 date seems to have been invalidated, more research needs to be done before we can ascertain that the situation really is as non-threatening as implied by Kotlyakov and Rees & Collins work.

EDIT: 6. I had a look at the Kotlyakov report (1) in more detail:

Taking air temperature records of the Tien Shari Weather Station and assuming that the same linear trend is to keep up (unfortunately, linear extrapolation is inevitable here), we may find that the mean annual temperature in Central Asia may go up 1.5° C by the year 2350. Proceeding from these rough estimates, in Tables 10, and 11 we have derived figures for glaciation shrinkage DS, changes in the specific glacier melt runoff Rd and the volume of this runoff QRd, as well as for the overall rise of the ocean level Z SL. These data apply to Central Asian glaciers and all of the extrapolar glaciation of the Earth.
...
... The extrapolar glaciation of the Earth will be decaying at rapid, catastrophic rates—its total area will shrink from 500,000 to 100,000 km² by the year 2350.

Hmmm... so he is modeling a (linear!) 1.5C temperature rise over Central Asia during the century, when the projected global average for just the next century ranges up to as high as 6.1C (IPCC) and increases exponentially over time (and that's discounting tipping points, the dimming effect, the "Archer bonus", etc).

Over the last month and a half a significant news story has come forth that has not deserved its relative lack of attention. See, as it turns out, the IPCC was wrong. Dead wrong.

The IPCC put forward the claim in its last working report that if CO2 emissions were released unabated then the Himalayan glaciers would disappear by 2035, and by way of consequent drought, kill millions of people dependent on rivers whose source lies in the Himalayas glacial run off. (That includes, off the top of my head, the Yangtze, the Mekong, the Ganges, the Meghna, and the Indus.)

Two months ago the Indian environmental ministry published their own report that claimed the opposite -- the Himalayas were in no way about to dry off the face of the Earth.

Coming as it did before Copenhagen, most Western environmentalists dismissed the report as a cheap ploy to strengthen their negotiating position before the conference. (To see my thoughts on that conference, see here.

But, it turns out the Indians may have been onto something. A few scientists and reporters dug into the report... and discovered that the 2035 figure was baseless. The real number was not 2035, but 2350.

I could tell the story of how all this happened, but others have already blazed that trail better than I can. And I present:

By the Way, there will still be glaciers in 2035.
John Nielsen-Gammon. Atmo.Sphere. 12 December 2009.

Peer Review in the IPCC
Roger Peilke Jr. Roger Peilke Jr’s Blog. 23 December 2009.

Seperating Climate Facts from Fears
Editors. New Scientist. 13 January 2010.

I do not have enough time to comment on this one, but I think the story will be appreciated by members of this forum:

RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS FIELD TEST GEOENGINEERING
Chris Mooney. The Intersection. 14 December 2009.

@A. Karlin

I've never understood the concepts behind using nanobots to clean up greenhouse gases. They'd need to somehow fly up to them, catch them, and break them apart? That would require quite a lot of energy and intelligence (given that CO2 is inert), right?

Unfortunately such a scheme, once started would be impossible to stop.
Virtually all atmospheric CO2 available would be consumed and converted into nanobot dust.
Plants would fail to secure CO2 feedstock and food chain would end up terminated in the process.

I don't see why they would necessarily have to be replicators. You could create a lot of them using the top-down method (very expensive, granted), and if they're extremely efficient they can feasibly do the job without replication?

So, as I have stated before, to make process of CO2 removal cheap we would need to make nanobots which are dangerously related to gray goo type of replicators.
I can imagine some safety devices incorporated to such replicators (to prevent them running uncontrollable amok) but one must understand that such micromachines would in reality have all properties of highly competitive life forms.
Any life forms released to environment will invariably face prospect of mutation and natural selection of the fittest mutants, so initially inserted safety devices could easily cease to function in some successful "mutants".
At this point we are facing terminal gray goo event with termination of food chain.

@T. Greer

The sun, like this Earth, has only a limited amount of resources. It is a mathematical certainty that one day these resources will run dry. This is a physical, real world problem that has no solutions, not even in theory.

Forgive me for not staying awake at night in fear of this certainty.

Eventual collapse of exponential growth model in physically constrained world is a mathematical certainty.

This is true. But perhaps you will see my point better if I provide you with another true statement:

Eventual collapse of exponential growth model in physically constrained solar system is a mathematical certainty.

The sun, like this Earth, has only a limited amount of resources. It is a mathematical certainty that one day these resources will run dry. This is a physical, real world problem that has no solutions, not even in theory.

Forgive me for not staying awake at night in fear of this certainty.

@Martin,

I would greatly appreciate your insights on this matter - please feel free to start a new post. And thanks for the link, which I'll make sure to read. For now, two comments:

1. I've never understood the concepts behind using nanobots to clean up greenhouse gases. They'd need to somehow fly up to them, catch them, and break them apart? That would require quite a lot of energy and intelligence (given that CO2 is inert), right?
2. I don't see why they would necessarily have to be replicators. You could create a lot of them using the top-down method (very expensive, granted), and if they're extremely efficient they can feasibly do the job without replication?

@A. Karlin
I understand, that you intended to write "no longer" in your remarks regarding "grey goo".

Well, obviously no longer, if one want to consider making some output of consumer end products by nanofactory working on very sophisticated raw materials not available in natural environment.
However if one want to do geoengineering by nanotech means, he must release to environment nanobots which are able to:
1. survive there.
2. replicate in the wild. That is the only way to secure enormous numbers necessary to do geoengineering project.
3. do something useful like CO2 capture from atmosphere to lower temperatures.

Such nanobots will in fact become to be a sort of life form and become to be subjected to mutation and natural selection process.
No way around that problem.
Hence a risk of gray goo scenario.

And heck, what if replication of these nanobots were actually limited by CO2 availability in the air?
You would not get global scale "gray goo" but you could easily wipe out nearly all CO2, and terminated plant life (and food chain) by the same.

Somehow I think that release of replicating nanobots to the wild will prove to be our final invention.
The question is, will we prove so stupid to actually proceed with that or not?

There is much discussion about possibilities of containment of deliberately released gray goo, but the arguments that it could be done are weak. I could point out countless pitfalls in such strategies, if anyone bother to wish to discuss it with me (I was in the past working in academia on so called "molecular switch", which is a quite related subject to artificial replicators).
In any case here is one of many academic discussions of the problem presented in the form digestible for public:
http://lifeboat.com/ex/global.ecophagy
You will surely notice there that nanobots applicable in possible geoengineering projects are inherently overlapping with grey goo type of replicators.
So I doubt that anyone sane would deliberately meddle with these and release them into wild.

@T. Greer,

You are correct that R&D tends to increase during normal recessions. Companies don't need to increase their production capacity, so they shift instead to designing better products in anticipation of better times.

However, what we may see is not a mere recession or even depression, but a full-fledged discontinuity, e.g. a loss of faith in any future economic growth - not an unrealistic proposition in a world of limits to growth where the likes of an expanding China come into intense competition for remaining resources.

So perhaps another valid scenario would be like the Soviet collapse, in which the share of R&D in the national economy fell from an advanced-industrial rate of 2.5% of GDP in the 1980's to around 1.0% in the post-Soviet era, a figure which hasn't substantially changed even during the Putin-era recovery. (Nor was this even especially tied to reductions in military R&D - it remained at a constant 75% of all R&D activity both during the USSR and in today's Russia).

This does not mean a technological collapse, of course. Progress will continue, at least in some technological spheres, although at a much lower pace.

Re-nanotechnology.

It is already a multi-billion dollar industry, e.g. computer chips, but not yet revolutionary - as of today, this is just a continuation of traditional top-down miniaturization (the procedure that gave us clocks, gauges, etc). For that to happen we need to master bottom-up, molecular nanotechnology.

Whether this will happen in the requisite timeframe to solve out LtG problems is highly uncertain. Ray Kurzweil believes it will (he projects the nanotech revolution by the 2030's); if he proves too optimistic or the speed of technological progress is derailed by disruptions, it will not come in time.

PS. AFAIK, "grey goo" has no longer been considered to be a serious danger by people in the know for quite a while now.

I would like to leave with a question, for anyone interested- do you think that progress in nanotechnology is going to crash and burn, hitting limits to growth anytime soon? Progress in this field could easily transform geoengineering into a cheap and viable policy option.

I find this talk of non-existent technological change to be very silly. On paper the idea of R&D being cut seems to make sense, but history doesn't support the notion.

I find this talk of non-existent technological change to be very silly. On paper the idea of R&D being cut seems to make sense, but history doesn't support the notion. Past depressions and recessions did not reduce the amount or the pace of technological advance. A quick look at patent statistics supports this statement. (Indeed, one notices that there was an acceleration in the number of patents issued during the Great Depression!)

If you look at genetics or IT, one might conclude it will continue accelerating, perhaps away into a technological singularity; look at more mundane, but more central, things such as the internal combustion engine, and you might conclude progress is already slowing down rapidly, despite the proliferation of R&D centers and universities around the world.

Imagine, if you will, an analyst in 1899 saying, "If you look at diesel automobiles and other oil powered machinery, one might conclude that technological growth will continue accelerating. But if you look at the more mundane and central technologies, such as the steel plow or steel framed wagon wheel, you might conclude that technological progress is already slowing down, despite the proliferation of advanced farming techniques across the world!"

I would like to leave with a question, for anyone interested- do you think that progress in nanotechnology is going to crash and burn, hitting limits to growth anytime soon? Progress in this field could easily transform geoengineering into a cheap and viable policy option.

One more thing not covered above. What will happen IF there is a Chinese collapse with massive refugee flows, in which the Chinese state does not make a last-ditch attempt to conquer Lebensraum? Given enough ruthlessness and disregard to human rights, the Russian Army, or any modern army, has the full technical capability to defend its own soil from any amount of unarmed, desperate refugees. It won't even be a fight. The big question in this scenario is whether it would come to that.

Wow, great discussion folks.

Re-Geoengineering

Both T. Greer and Martin make very good points. It is however interesting that ultimately, despite that Greer is much more optimistic about technological progress, we all come to the same conclusion - if successful, effective cooperation on geoengineering is going to be extremely hard to achieve, and may easily tip over into geophysical warfare.

I liked Martin's remarks on technology. It is going to be very interesting seeing whether progress in this area is going to accelerate, decelerate, or stay the same. Not only money and resources are involved, however, but the nature of different technological branches as well. If you look at genetics or IT, one might conclude it will continue accelerating, perhaps away into a technological singularity; look at more mundane, but more central, things such as the internal combustion engine, and you might conclude progress is already slowing down rapidly, despite the proliferation of R&D centers and universities around the world.

Based on these observations, my strong impression is that much of the physical base of industrial civilization will retain its basic current, form - a world of highways, railways, steel mills, conveyor belts, mines, etc. However, it will be rapidly overlain by a global electronic net of ever bigger scope and overall intelligence, which will allow the entire system to become much more efficient and much more "controlled". But it will still remain the same system, based on extracting resources and emitting pollution; all its efficiency gains swallowed up by increased demand from emerging Asia (at a global scale, the Jevons paradox will continue).

This is unsustainable for any significant amount of time, which is is why I believe there *will* be attempts at geoengineering, like Greer; but like Martin I am very skeptical as to their chances of success.

Re-the China / Russia relations.

The Rosstat estimates of Chinese migrants are indeed low (the true figure is around 250,000, according to the non-polemical academic studies). For today, there is relatively little settlement of Chinese in Russia. Wages in the Russian Far East are somewhat higher than in North-East China, but the advantages are eaten up by bribes and living in an unfamiliar, costlier environment. According to polls, the vast majority of Chinese seasonal migrants to the Far East have no intention of staying.

I've written an essay on this topic, The Myth of the Yellow Peril: Overhyping Chinese Migration into Russia. The last bit may be worth quoting at length since it directly touches on many of the issues raised.

I will now go beyond demography into geopolitics. China is not the monolith that it is usually painted as in the West; its strong central government conceals a greater deal of simmer, dynamism and regionalism. The idea that it could organize a successful stealth demographic invasion of the Far East is preposterous. The only way in which something like this could succeed would be if Russia were to collapse again and to a far greater extent than during the 1990's, e.g. like during the Civil War when Vladivostok was occupied by the Japanese. This is possible, but highly unlikely.

What you have instead is a reversion to Nineteenth-century traditions, in which Korean and Chinese laborers and traders made seasonal migrations to the Far East and built up sizable, but far from demographically dominant, communities in the region (who were later deported to Central Asia in 1937 over fears of Japanese espionage).

Why a Russo-Chinese War Is Extremely Unlikely

Speaking of which, that would be a real concern if China were to ever invade. That said, Chinese expansion has always been primarily aimed at South East Asia - today's strategic posture and Chinese military planning in general emphasizes a limited, hi-tech war against the likes of Taiwan, Japan the U.S. Historically China aimed to achieve three geopolitical aims in the following order:

1) Maintain central authority over the commercial seaboard and the peasant hinterland

2) Surround itself by a buffer of vassal states on land - Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, etc.

3) Build a strong navy to repel sea-based foreign predation, protect its trade and extend its influence over East Asia. Now and in the future, China is going to have cope with a panoply of threats to those geopolitical goals - rising inequalities, a disconnected bureaucracy, ethnic separatism and American and Japanese sea power. In other words, it's going to have its hands full and Chinese willingness to pursue reconciliation and friendship with Russia is a reflection of its need for a safe strategic rear (see Sino-Russian Relations in China Debates the Future Security Environment, Michael Pillsbury).

China is going to run into severe ecological problems within the next few decades. Water tables are plummeting in the country's northern breadbasket, crop yields are stagnating and the deserts are spreading. The south has plenty of water but is threatened by inundation due to the melting of the icecaps. The rivers that feed its people and industry are going to run dry as the Himalayan glaciers melt away. This means that as soon as the 2030's, overpopulated China will be faced with a scenario in which it will either have to acquire new lands or face a sustenance crisis, perhaps culminating in a die-off typical of past cycles. Would it invade the Russian Far East?

The problem with this is that even if it were to succeed in conquering it, actually building up the infrastructure for human accommodation will take decades; the land is barren, mountainous and will remain very cold even after significant global warming [Haushofer's point about lack of infrastructure]. The actual war will be very costly for the Chinese because the Russians will almost certainly use their huge stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons to check the assault. Should the Russians lose, it's possible they will unleash their much superior strategic nuclear arsenal or even worse weapons on China - thus destroying their industrial infrastructure and precipitating a massive die-off.

Hence I believe that if, or more likely when, ecological problems reach a critical point in China they will expand into (by then collapsed?) East Africa, using the mighty navy they foresightedly built up to forestall anyone who has a problem with that. It will also guarantee continued energy, food and resource flows into metropolitan China from Australia and Latin America. Eventually it is possible that Russia (and Canada) will fully open up their borders to immigration from the sinking and drying south, in which case the Far East will become Chinese. But this is all futuristic speculation.

One more thing not covered above. What will happen IF there is a Chinese collapse with massive refugee flows, in which the Chinese state does not make a last-ditch attempt to conquer Lebensraum? Given enough ruthlessness and disregard to human rights, the Russian Army, or any modern army, has the full technical capability to defend its own soil from any amount of unarmed, desperate refugees. It won't even be a fight. The big question in this scenario is whether it would come to that.

Terrorism in Xinjing alone is not likely to cause much population displacement.
You must understand that Xinjing is a mineral rich province of China and also relatively unpopulated one due to harsh environmental conditions.
I do not expect Han Chinese to face insurmountable problems with their attempts to pacify this province, should need arisen, at least until China itself have faced ultimate ecological collapse.
You must remember that something like 92% of citizens of China are Han Chinese - a largest "tribe" on the world. So despite of many minorities living there Han Chinese are in overwhelming excess and are not afraid of any troublesome minorities, which should worst come to worst may simply end up exterminated.
In Xinjing Han Chinese are already constituting about 50% of inhabitants, so it would not be an easy task to flush them out, say to Russia or to Kazakhstan.

Chinese are not like Americans either. They care little about so called "human rights" which are recently preventing Americans from winning conclusively in Afghanistan.
If they face some local minority uprising here or there, they will simply crush population, very much like they are doing on Tibet right now or like Batu Khan have done in Russia 800 years ago or so.
They are not afraid of atomic weapons either, what was clearly demonstrated during Korean War.
US Army was never in its history escaping faster.

Nevertheless I agree with you that numbers of Chinese already settled within Russian Federation is in all probabilities grossly underestimated. Vast areas of Russian Far East are very sparsely populated and practically beyond administrative control of Russian authorities.
Native locals there are also ethnically far more related to Chinese than to Russians and this can complicate issues further because they might be sympathetic to Chinese immigrants and assist them with resettlement.

In any case, facing inevitable ecological collapse guaranteed by current economic model, vast numbers of destitute Chinese will have a little choice but to attempt resettlement up north.
Nature abhors vacuum.
If there are inhabitable lands on Russian Far East and Russians are not inhabiting these, someone other will.

Facing ecological die-off very few peoples would curl on the floor and peacefully die singing Kumbayaah.
They will try to survive regardless and their ends will justify means.

@Martin

I think more likely that terrorists in Xinjing would force Chinese immigration into Siberia like the US and others tried to do and they did for a period between 97 and 2000 use Chechnya as a base to destabilise the whole of Russia's South

I am amazed actually at how little Chinese there is at only 34577 according to the 2002 Russian census.Surely there must be some mistake/flaw in the census?

I am amazed how people completely underestimate the scope and scale of this terrorism issue in Russia, Central Asia and China it's international, interconnected Central Asian terrorists groups with ties to western intelligence and Soviet era Russian/Israeli organised crime (check out some of the research and investigative work of Dennis Hopsicker which I posted in the thread 10 things you didnt know about 9/11). Some groups like Hiz-But-Tahrir even get government support in the UK and other European countries.

This is exactly how Communist coup came about in Russia through exiled international terrorist organisations with links and lobbying to western intelligence and international banking/financiers who can exert economic restrictions under any pretext and links to organised crime. The Marxist terrorists and organised crime like today’s Jihadist’s and organised crime KLA, Chechens, etc were probably two sides of the same coin, inter-connected one not be able to function and achieve success without the other.

China's population is going to face a decline in the next 10-30 years which will ease the ecological damage faced by the Chinese population.

Relative absence of infrastructure on Russian Far East will not prevent desperate ecological refugees from coming either, particularly if GW provided more farmable/inhabitable land there.
I think, Russians should take discussed scenario very seriously.

I am rather considering massive uncontrollable relocation of hundreds of millions of Chinese, once their local ecological carrying capacity have collapsed.

Also, Siberia and Russian far east don't have an infrastructure to quickly relocate hundreds of thousands or even millions of Chinese refugees.

I am not talking about lebensraum for Chinese.
I am rather considering massive uncontrollable relocation of hundreds of millions of Chinese, once their local ecological carrying capacity have collapsed.
No one, including Russian and Chinese Army combined, would be able to stop such a move and all those refugees would go where the carrying capacity still exist.
They would care little, is it Mongolia, Russia or Kazakhstan.