From my blog, http://www.gregrlawson.com
This was in response to a contest by Stratfor to come up with a geopolitical view of what U.S. foreign policy would look like absent 9/11.
I didn't win, but am curious as to your the readers of this blog's thoughts.
"U.S. Foreign Policy Absent 9/11: a Look at Key Relationships and Regions
While a few regions would have seen dramatically different U.S. foreign policy approaches towards them (mostly Mexico/South America and, of course, the Middle East/Afghanistan/Pakistan), much policy would not have changed as much as some would think had 9/11 not taken place.
The clear trajectory of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy prior to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 was to focus on “great power” conflict and management while transforming the military to act as an offshore balancer while promoting free trade. This was evident by the piece drafted by soon to be National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 2000 and there is no reason to envision that it would have changed dramatically absent that catalytic event.
Rice’s piece, entitled “Promoting the National Interest” was a clear rebuke to what then Presidential candidate George W. Bush saw as the failures of the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy. Rice summed up Bush’s anticipated approach extraordinarily succinctly with this passage:
“American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on the national interest and the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are
* to ensure that America 's military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails;
* to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S. national interest;
* to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom;
* to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China , that can and will mold the character of the international political system; and
* to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”
In essence, Bush had no desire to get involved in messy “nation-building” exercises. He did not intend to hector other countries about their humanitarian deficiencies and he intended to engage internationally with a consistent eye on the “national interest.” Given Rice’s penchant at the time for “realist” thinking, it is fairly evident that this would entail the U.S. playing the roll of off-shore balancer, who would place its prestige on the line only when a serious threat to a specific region materialized with the two most likely threats being Russia and China .
Further, while apparent that Bush would not ignore the nexus of rogue regimes, terrorism, and WMDs, it almost seemed as if this area of foreign policy was an afterthought, something to be monitored, but not a central focus.
That these basic tenets were unlikely to be unchanged was best exemplified by the Bush Administration’s response early in on in its time in office. The now nearly forgotten EP-3 incident of April, 2001, where a Chinese pilot shadowing an American spy plane in ostensibly international waters off China was killed when the planes collided, opened a classic game of choreographed great power diplomacy. That the incident ended with the delivery of the “Letter of the Two Sorries” and the release of the American crew that had been held on Hainan Island showed a delicate diplomatic dance between two major powers where each wanted to save face. This also was a likely portent of how Bush diplomacy would have been conducted absent 9/11.
The role played by Secretary of State Colin Powell was pronounced and probably would have remained quite strong throughout the First Term of President Bush had 9/11 not given a lease on life to a then struggling Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld and pushed Bush into the corner of Vice President Richard Cheney.
Given that basic framework, here is brief breakdown of major relations and regional relations and how the Bush Administration probably would have interacted absent 9/11.
China
While Bush’s notion of “strategic competitor” to describe China-US relations probably would have remained harsher for longer absent the shift in focus to the Middle East , it is quite unlikely that would have persisted throughout an entire First Term. More likely is that, just as President Clinton had found after excoriating the former President Bush of consorting with the “Butchers of Tiananmen”, the economic relationship between the two nations was of too much importance to allow it to slide into open hostility. Certainly, there would be a few obligatory bellicose statements from a senior Pentagon official here and there to pacify his conservative base, but American-Chinese relations would have been fairly strong.
Russia
The Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) or “Moscow Treaty” would have happened anyway. Bush clearly wanted to ditch the Antiballistic Missile Treaty so as to move forward with the politically popular, at least for conservatives, missile defense program. Overall, relations with Russia , despite the “I was able to get a sense of his soul” comment by Bush with respect to Russian President Putin, would have remained roughly on the same trajectory they went through after 9/11. However, it probably would have gotten frostier much more rapidly had there not been the warmth generated by Russia ’s initial support of American placement within Central Asia to deal with Afghanistan after 9/11.
Europe
Europe disliked the “Toxic Texan” long before 9/11. While absent 9/11 the Iraq War would not have happened, Europe still would have disagreed with Bush policies on Global Warming, disapproved of his perceived disdain of the United Nations, and worked hard to create a new pole of competition for the U.S. In response, the U.S. would have probably reached out to create new, positive relations with the central and eastern European nations such as Poland and the Czech Republic in order to counterbalance its difficulties with the Franco-German European Union axis.
East Asia and India
Given that even after 9/11 one of Bush’s more positive legacies revolved around relatively good relations with Japan and East Asia , it seems that this would have persisted. Though U.S.-Chinese relations would not have been as harsh as might have been expected, the U.S. would clearly have worked to keep the Japan alliance front and center while reaching out more to India in order to begin a soft containment strategy to hedge against a rising China .
As for North Korea , Bush’s trajectory would probably have remained the same. He came into office ridiculing the Clinton era “Agreed Framework” and made clear his distaste for negotiating with the regime. Consequently, while North Korea would not have been upgraded to a member of the “Axis of Evil”, efforts at international sanctions and imposition of isolation would have persisted. It is also quite likely that in a possible second Bush term, he would have veered, as he eventually did, towards a more diplomatic solution once he realized military action was impractical and meaningful sanctions a mirage given China’s unwillingness to risk destabilization on its border.
The U.S. also would have persisted in pushing trade in the region. In other words, the same general policy direction would have been pursued with respect to most of East Asia and India .
Africa
It is slightly less likely that Bush would have achieved such positive outcomes in Africa absent 9/11. Given the Administration’s aversion to Clintonian nation building, getting mired down too much in conflicts in Somalia , Sudan , etc would not have appealed to Bush. It is also unclear if the U.S. would have made the same commitment to AIDS reduction efforts absent what would become a perceived strategic interest in the region after it was feared Africa could host al-Qaeda training camps. Overall, Africa policy would have likely been permanently adrift.
Now we get to the two regions where policy would have seen the most dramatic changes absent 9/11.
Mexico and South America
Given President Bush’s expected close ties to then Mexican President Vicente Fox, it is highly likely that comprehensive immigration reform would have happened absent 9/11. Without the rampant security fears generated after the event, Bush and his pro-business allies would have found a way to move this policy to the front of the agenda. While unclear what the final policy would have looked like, it is almost certain that something dramatic would have happened which may have even helped to stem some of the drug violence now plaguing Mexico .
Additionally, while South America was virtually ignored after 9/11, it is highly likely President Bush would have pushed for more cooperation with the rising power on the continent, Brazil . Bush also would likely have taken an even more aggressive stand against Venezuela ’s Hugo Chavez since while he was only an irritant, the irritation would have been far more noticeable absent the focus on the Middle East . Additionally, free trade within the region, to prevent South America “going its own way” would have been near the top of the U.S. regional agenda and pushed far more aggressively by top officials with the cache to get results.
Middle East & Afghanistan/Pakistan
No where would the absence of 9/11 have been felt stronger than the Middle East . While President Bush likely would have remained a staunch supporter of Israel given his personal and religious beliefs, the militarization of policy in the region would not have happened.
Saddam Hussein would still be in power. Despite an apparent pre-existing desire to remove Hussein, it is unlikely in the extreme that without a major catalytic event that spawned serious fears of rogue states and WMD usage, the domestic support for anything beyond a Clinton like air assault could be obtained.
The U.S. would have essentially been left pursuing a dual containment strategy focusing on both Iran and Iraq similar to that being conducted by the Clinton team.
By not unleashing the many different forces that were in fact unleashed by the toppling of Hussein and the new rise of a Shiite dominated Iraq , Iran would be in a far less powerful position. While concerns over both nations’ WMD programs would have persisted, the U.S. would have attempted to subtly play each off the other, probably while trying to support moderates within Iran .
The Israel-Palestine issue would be nearly as convoluted as it actually became after 9/11. However, absent the zeal for democratization in the region that became the linchpin of Bush’s policy after 9/11, it is not highly likely that Hamas would have gained the amount of influence it has, nor would Hezbollah in Lebanon .
Therefore, the U.S. policy in the region would have been merely to keep the oil flowing and client regimes stable so as to not threaten that flow.
Additionally, it is obvious that the U.S. never would have intervened in Afghanistan nor put as much pressure on Pakistan to deal with the Taliban. It is even possible to envision absent 9/11 that the U.S. may have even attempted to work with the Taliban and offered them a certain amount of economic benefits from possible hydrocarbon pipelines in the region. Had this happened, it is possible the Taliban might have even been co-opted and turned against Osama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda while the U.S. gained leverage against Russia as part of an effort to circumvent Russian control of Europe ’s access to energy.
In summation, in several areas, notably with respect to “Great Powers” like Russia and China as well European relations and those with India , U.S. policy would not have differed much absent 9/11.
However, its relations in its own hemisphere and in the Middle East would have looked radically different as the U.S. worried less about abstract morality and terrorism, and more on traditional, state based competitions and threats. It is quite unlikely that policy in the Middle East would have become militarized any more than it had been throughout the entire Clinton era. Ironically, policy in central and South America may actually have become more militarized as part of an effort to counteract leftist revolutionaries and the drug trade had the focus not shifted to the Middle East ."
