Thanks for the comments, Gregor - they are always appreciated.
2. Re-welfare states. I've recently done a paper specifically on the welfare state for my political science class, and one thing I've learned is that it can be a) quite precisely defined, and b) there are several "types" of welfare state. I'll quote the relevant bits from it.
First, welfare states are explicitly market-based (ranging the gamut from America’s relative laissez-faire to Belarus’ “market socialism”) – according to Marshall, it “did not reject the capitalist market economy, but held that there were some elements in a civilized life which ranked above it and must be achieved by curbing or suppressing the market” . Second, it does not (necessarily) aim for radical economic or social transformations; its goals are more modest – “the characteristically welfare statist approach is to opt for readjusting final distributions [primarily to relieve those in the most distress through direct provision of basic needs like food, shelter, etc], rather than altering the pattern of property rights in productive resources that gave rise to undesirable distributions in the first place” . Third, welfare is enshrined in law and viewed as a universal civil right for those deserving of it, in contrast to private charities and the “public charity” embodied in the English Poor Laws (their aid being viewed as gifts and humiliating to have to accept).
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First, there is the “liberal welfare state” (the US, Australia), which regard markets as the primary guarantors of welfare with government only stepping in to restrict un-competitive practices, streamline market distortions and assume only minimal relief obligations from private charitable and religious groups. This setup, based on the “freedom to choose” (or “freedom to lose” according to left-wing critics)... Second, there is the “corporatist welfare state” prevalent in continental Europe (France, Germany), a socially conservative philosophy in which the provision of welfare is tied to the imperative of maintaining social stability. According to Mahmud, Goodin and Parpo , “corporatists see freedom in more Hegelian terms, in which people are freed to realize their true nature as fundamentally social beings living in organic groups (first and foremost, the family)”. Third, and the most radical one, is the “social democratic welfare state” (Sweden), which completely eschews the negative liberties of non-intervention embodied in classical liberalism, and instead aggressively pushes (self-defined) social progress and egalitarianism through state institutions and regulations – they define economic freedom not as “to choose” (liberals) or “to lose” (leftists), but as “freedom from [want]” rather than “freedom to [do almost whatever you want]”.
My thoughts on this are that formally speaking, in terms of definitions, Britain has over the decades (starting from Attlee) gone from being a "liberal" welfare state, to a "social democratic" welfare state. Because obviously a state that spends 50%+ of the GDP cannot be considered considered "liberal", nor can Britain be considered "corporatist" in the continental European tradition, as I'm sure you'll agree. So unless it's some kind of strange new creature like a "neoliberal welfare state" 
, the only option remaining is the "social democratic" welfare state - the philosophy has gone from people being "free to" [choose], to being "free from" [fear, want, etc], all thanks to the state - and with all its connotations of psychological dependence on said state.
And to be fair to Britain, its state is indeed a "last resort for those unable/ incapable of finding work, but place a strong emphasis on the state as provider of work, education and training". If you want to pick up a cheque from the job centers in Britain, you have to furnish proof you are actively looking for a job; after about 6 months, you are *assigned* work training or "make-work". (I knew some people on the dole, not making this up). Sounds pretty social democratic to me.
What *can* be argued is that Britain is doing a piss poor job of running a SD welfare state compared with the Scandinavian nations. IMO, the root cause of this is 1) the poor primary & secondary education system and 2) the continuation of a rigid class system, which produces an unnatural clash with the post-WW2 SD elements. It is a damning indictment that despite the huge government spending, indicators like social mobility and child poverty rates in Britain are some of the lowest in developed Europe.
Re-manufacturing. The problem is that only a few very disciplined nations have the right psychology and institutions to make their manufacturing internationally competitive. Japan is one. Germany and Sweden are others. The Asian dragons. Britain obviously doesn't fit into that group. So it'll have to turn protectionist to be competitive, but problem is a) it goes against today's reigning ideology - though probably not for much longer, and b) there will be retaliatory measures. That said, I fully expect all this to happen within the next decade.
Re-demography. Unemployable and uneducated are relative concepts. Slash welfare and remove the minimum wage - as I argue in this article, quite possibly things Britain will be *forced* to do soon - and the invisible hand will find them jobs.
3. Medieval patterns resurrecting themselves. Scotland wants a powerful guarantor against English revanchism. France finds an outpost north of its traditional English rivals useful for containing them.
4. Increased religiosity does not necessarily correlate with increased fertility, at least in non-immigrant communities. Poland is far more religious than Sweden, but the latter has much healthier demography. Poland is both more comfortable / prosperous *and* much more religious than Russia, but Russia's TFR has already risen about 1.5 since 2006, whereas Poland's remains on a plateau below 1.3. Plenty more examples. As such I wouldn't put much stock in religious trends to forecast fertility, at least not in Europe.
The only place where Russia in influential in the Balkans is Serbia and Montenegro, which are Orthodox and Slavic, and some pipelines, and a friend in Greece. Turkey has the allegiance of Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania; more friends in the West; and much wider economic penetration. I'd say Turkey has the upper hand now due to closer proximity, though should Russia reabsorb Ukraine the competition may equalize - and become more intense.
5. I don't think so.
First, I am only forecasting to 2030-2040 or so at most, because there is very little point going beyond those points. In particular, by then the effects of climate change and high-EROEI energy depletion will probably be occupying a very central position.
Second, this is an important point because the folks who will be entering the labor force in 2025 have already been born; we can be reasonable sure that by that date, no matter what happens in the interval, there will be more 20-year old French to support the welfare state, old people, fight in the army, etc, than there will be 20-year old Germans. This will be the case even if next year Germany's and France's fertility indicators switch places, which is not, of course, going to happen.
, by projecting current demographics into the future. In the case of France, the healthy demographics are a very modern trend which shows that a couple of decades can see a recovery/ slump.
