Below are several comments I left at multiple websites including the Atlantic Council and Atlantic Community. They are the beginnings of what I think a new American posture in the Middle East may need to look like.
Comments welcome:
Turkey's future is open. It has the opportunity to verify its's post-Ottoman, Kemalist trajectory should Europe be pushed into grudingly opening their eyes to a strategic necessity or it can choose to become a new pole of Islamism competing with Wahhabism of the Saudi strain or Shiism of Iranian flavor.For the U.S. and for Europe, it is obvious that a Turkey within the "West" is better than watching it compete for status in the Middle East. Turkey can be a linchpin in a more multifaceted energy policy for Europe and can represent a bridge to the Middle East for the "West" provided it does not slide into a hard Islamist phase.
All that said, it is probably time for the U.S. to begin contingency planning for an eastward shifting Turkey. While pushing Europe to be willing to integrate Turkey is appropriate, it has to be assumed that this may fail due to recalcitrance on either or both of the European and Turkish sides.
The balance of power between Sunni and Shia has shifted since the 2003 Iraq War. With Turkey, perhaps, returning with focus to the region, the U.S. may need to recalibrate its relations across the board. Consequently, the U.S. must shore up its relations with current and potential allies in the Middle East. Notable among these is Israel, but, probably a serious examination of our long-term arrangements with Shiite Iraq and Iran needs to be considered and considered in tandem as opposed to seperately as seems often to be the case.
A bold, "Nixon goes to China" moment with Iran could reset the geopolitics of the Middle East and create new realities that shake up conventional thinking. This might even reorient Turkish calculations and make it more amenable to Western interests even absent a full throated endorsement by the Europeans.
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/iran-problems-go-beyond-nukes
It is time for a "Nixon Goes to China" moment. While no doubt, President Obama envisions this as a hoped for eventual possibility, it is unlikely he will take the adequate steps to make such a seeming fantasy reality.While Bush would not talk to the Iranians (at least not publicly until late in his Administration), President Obama has bordered on being obsequious. Both were wrong because they are trying to bottle up a problem that can't be bottled up.
Nuclear proliferation is already a reality and will only increase. It is time to forget the overburdened and impossible to adequately implement non-proliferation regime. Attempting to block nations on an ad hoc basis will only squander scarce resources. Better to face up to the scary reality of numerous nations seeking and acquiring nuclear weapons.
Once this is realized and leaders stop clinging to fantasies of stopping proliferation and embracing pie in the sky notions of "Global Zero," the sooner they can reembrace deterrence.
Iran, contrary to assertions by many, is likely to be deterrable. However, deterrence will need to be quite explicit and quite harsh to be effective. If a line is drawn on what is unacceptable, any crossing of that line must not yield "discussions", "negotiations", or "processes." Such a crossing must be made unbearable so that it won't seriously be contemplated.
If aggressive deterrence can be established psychologically (the domain where deterrence actually resides), then a "deal" can be made that will allow Iran a certain degree of security within well defined limits. The regime can be assured that no external forces or externally supported internal forces (as opposed to solely internal forces) will overthrow it. It may even be possible to envision allowing it to develop nuclear power (and even a limited weapon) capability to save face.
Naturally, all of the concerns over terrorism and expanding Iranian influece throughout the Middle East seem to mitigate against this notion. Indeed, it is counterintuitive for many to consider. However, the hinge once more pivots upon the quality of deterrence and the legitimacy (and perceived seriousness) of the threats backing up that deterrence.
Iran will go nuclear. The U.S. can either find a creative way of dealing with this undesired but unstoppable predicament, or it can continue levelling empty threats of military action and scrambling about for meaningful (rather than superficial) sanctions.
As for Israel, which clearly feels the Iranian development of a nuclear weapon as an existential threat, robust defense cooperation must continue. It must also be made quite clear that the U.S. understands its fears and would not allow an attack upon it to be answered with anything except the most aggressive of responses. Without these assurances, it would be close to impossible for Israel not to respond unilaterally.