Now I’ve never really worried about the consequences on mortality of an economic recession, because I don’t buy into The Lancet‘s arguments that it was the reduction in Russian social spending in 1998 that contributed to the mortality wave of 1999-2002, since the increasing affordability of, and consumption of, alcohol was by far the more convincing factor. (Also, in industrialized states, recessions tend to correlate with falls in mortality rates). On the other hand, hard recessions – especially ones which result in reduced public spending on social welfare – usually are associated with substantial reductions in fertility. In this post I’m going to take a look at how valid these observations and theories are in light of the recent economic crisis in Eastern Europe.

Russia. At the start of the crisis in late 2008, I expected Russia’s fertility rate to fall slightly – though nowhere near the magnitudes predicted by Russia’s “demographic doomers”, of course. (Though even for that I got a lot of flak). Yet ironically even my predictions turned out to be too pessimistic, probably because increased government spending meant that Russians’ social welfare hardly suffered at all during the crisis. Even Russia’s fertility rate continued to climb, reaching 1.56 in 2009 (2008 – 1.49, 2007 – 1.41, 2006 – 1.30), a level last seen in 1992. And like I said, Russia’s trends towards falling mortality actually accelerated, with life expectancy for both genders hitting 69.0 years in 2009 (2008 – 67.9, 2007 – 67.5, 2006 – 66.6, 2005 – 65.3) – a level that was only ever previously observed in 1963-1974 and 1986-1991. Most encouragingly, Russians’ mortality from “vices” – homicide, alcohol poisoning, and suicide – have fallen back to their late Soviet levels. The decline in alcohol poisonings is particularly good because much of Russia’s “hyper-mortality” (including the high rate of heart disease) is tied to excessive alcohol consumption.

[Source: Rosstat].

Demographic improvements relative to the same period last year continued in Q1 2010, with the birth rate up another 1.3% and mortality rates falling by 2.0% (inc. by about 10% for external causes). (The figures on fertility are particularly significant when you recall that Russia reached the nadir of its economic crisis in H1 2009). According to Sergey Slobodyan’s demographic model, the data indicates that a projection of 1.9-2.0mn deaths and 1.8-1.9mn births in 2010 is feasible, meaning that natural population decrease will almost cease (the total population should grow, as last year, due to immigrants).

Conclusion – contrary to hysterical predictions of economic and demographic apocalypse propagated about Russia in late 2008, the real impact on social welfare was very marginal and the demographic situation actually continued to improve. This year, Russia’s life expectancy will probably approach 70 years (still very low for an industrialized country) and its total fertility rate will hit around 1.6 children per woman (as in Canada). Although the mortality rate remains very substandard relative to the industrialized world, current healthcare and anti-alcohol initiatives are helping usher in rapid improvements.

PS. There has been a small update to Rosstat‘s demographic projections. Its middle projection now indicates a population of 140.9mn and its high projection a population of 146.7mn in 2025, relative to 141.9mn in 2009; in the last few years, Russia’s demography has tracked between the High and Medium projections. (This is in line with my own forecasts).

Ukraine. Mark Adomanis claims that Ukraine has a “much more serious demographic crisis than Russia”. But much as one can condemn Orange mismanagement of the economy and social relations, it can’t really be said in good faith that its demography is a lot worse. Whereas its birth rates are lower and its death rates are higher than Russia’s, this is in large part because Ukraine has a marginally older median age than Russia.

Let’s instead use measures that cancel out the effects of specific population age structure. Ukraine’s life expectancy (68.3) was marginally better than Russia’s (67.8) in 2008 (World Bank), and its big mortality reductions in 2008-09 indicate that it kept the lead. Similarly, Russia’s fertility rate (1.49) is not awesomely bigger than Ukraine’s (1.39) in 2008, and may be partly or wholly explained by the fact that Russia’s demographic collapse in the 1990’s was both quicker and sharper than Ukraine’s. Finally, both countries have been displaying very similar demographic dynamics in recent years, despite their political differences – a moderate recovery in fertility rates (from a low base), and plummeting death rates (from a very high base).

[Source: World Bank Development Indicators. Note that for all the vast differences in the political economy and post-transition success of Russia, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine, their fertility (and overall demographic) dynamics are remarkably alike].

Now what about the crisis, which hit Ukraine much harder than Russia? (Ukraine’s GDP declined by 15% in 2009, compared to Russia’s 9%, and it wasn’t cushioned by increased government spending on social welfare). Ukraine’s birth rate increased ever so slightly from 11.0/1000 in 2008 to 11.1/1000 in 2009 (but fell from 11.2/1000 in Jan-Feb 2009 to 10.7/1000 in Jan-Feb 2010). Meanwhile, its death rate decreased from 16.3/1000 in 2008 to 15.2/1000 in 2009 (and from 17.2/1000 in Jan-Feb 2009 to 16.4/1000 in Jan-Feb 2010). In crude terms, Ukraine had a higher rate of natural population decrease than Russia (-4.2/1000 versus -1.7/1000 in 2009), and its overall population is still falling fast because unlike Russia it does not have many immigrants.

Nonetheless, the Ukrainian crisis is now easing and the new government seems to be moving from concentrating on historical grievances to modernization and stability. Given the inherent similarities between and increasing integration of Russia and Ukraine, their demographic dynamics will probably be likewise similar - a recovery of fertility rates to 1.7-1.8 within a few years, a rise in life expectancy to 75 years within a decade, substantial net migration to Russia and zero net migration to Ukraine. The result would be a slowly rising or stagnating population in Russia, and a stagnating or slowly falling population in Ukraine.

Conclusion – Ukraine is experiencing a demographic recovery, with particularly impressive gains in life expectancy during the crisis. Though its fertility rate remained more or less stagnant, it now again shows signs of improvement – a good sign, since nine months ago Ukraine was still at its economic nadir.

Belarus. Thanks to its isolation from the global financial system, Belarus did not experience much of an economic crisis at all. It’s GDP even grew by 1.5% in 2009, and has since expanded by 6.1% in Jan-Apr 2010 relative to the same period last year. But ironically, its demographic improvements have been modest.

The birth rate rose from 11.1/1000 to 11.6/1000 and the death rate rose from 13.8/1000 to 14.2/1000 from 2008 to 2009*. (In Q1 2010 relative to the same period last year, the birth rate fell from 11.3/1000 to 11.2/1000 and the death rate fell from 15.3/1000 to 15.1/1000). The rate of natural increase eased slightly to -2.5/1000 in 2009, from -2.6/1000 in 2008.

This means that Belarus retained a fertility rate of about 1.45-1.5 children per woman in 2009, compared to Russia’s 1.56 and Ukraine’s 1.4-1.45, and its life expectancy was somewhat higher than both at 70.5 years in 2008 (very slightly lower in 2009), compared with Russia’s 69.0 years in 2009 and Ukraine’s 68.3 years in 2008 (maybe a year higher in 2009).

Conclusion – despite emerging from the crisis largely unscathed, the demography of Belarus showed no significant improvement (or deterioration).

Latvia. Latvia saw a catastrophic decline of GDP of 18% in 2010 and its welfare state has been decimated to a degree unparalleled anywhere else in Europe (at least so far). From 2008 to 2009, births fell by 9.5% and marriages, a very rough indicator of future fertility, fell by a truly stunning 23.3%. The decline continued into 2010, with births in Jan-Mar falling by 11.6% and marriages declining by 22.4% on the same period in 2009. Since Latvia’s total fertility rate was a not too healthy 1.45 back in 2008, this means that it is now in one of the deepest demographic chasms in Europe.

[Source: Latvijas Statistika].

On the positive side, Latvia did see modest improvements in its mortality rates, which fell by 3.6% from 2008 to 2009 (though they’ve remained almost stagnant so far in 2010). Unsurprisingly, after a period of demographic recovery in the 2000′s, Latvia’s rate of natural population decrease has started opening up again, rising from a loss of 7058 people in 2008 to 8220 people in 2009, and almost certain to increase further this year.

Small consolation. Going by the experiences of other countries in the region, the falling marriage rate in Latvia should have been accompanied by a simultaneously falling divorce rate, so the post-2008 annual decline in net couple formation should have been less than 20%.

Estonia. Estonia’s had a milder recession than Latvia with a GDP fall of 14% (it’s all comparative!) and it did not decimate its welfare state to quite the same extent. It also started from a position of significantly greater affluence and its fertility rate was at 1.66 children per woman in 2008. The number of births fell by 2.6% from 2008 to 2009, and by a mere 0.9% in the first four months of 2010 relative to the same period last year. This decline was outpaced by improvements in longevity, with mortality rates falling by 3.7% in 2009 relative to 2008, and a further 3.5% in the first four months of 2010 relative to the same period in 2009. Since it now shows signs of mounting an early recovery, the crisis should not make a big dent in Estonia’s long-term demographic prospects.

Lithuania. Their situation seems to have become somewhat worse, based on the monthly estimates of the population size for 2009. But their national statistics site is bad and doesn’t have detailed recent data so I can’t really say much more than that it is worse than in Estonia but far better than in Latvia.

Conclusion – the crisis has been a demographic disaster for Latvia, with its total fertility probably falling to a “lowest-low” rate of around 1.2 children per woman by 2010. Since its economic crisis seems to be deep and long-lasting, with deleterious effects on social welfare, we can expect a resumption of demographic free fall and perhaps a rise in ethnic Russian emigration to (fast recovering) Russia. In contrast, Estonia’s stronger foundations weathered the crisis well and its total fertility rate, now at perhaps 1.6 children per woman, is still relatively healthy by East and Central European standards.

Caucasus. In Armenia, the crude death rate remained unchanged at 8.5/1000 from 2008 and 2009, while the birth rate rose from 12.7/1000 to 13.7/1000, despite its big decline in GDP during the crisis. Given that its total fertility rate was at 1.74 in 2008, it is doing fine. Georgia is probably doing OK, since their population actually rose in 2009 – the only other post-Soviet year in which Georgia experienced population growth was in 2006, which happened to coincide with Russia’s deportation of illegal Georgian immigrants.

Moldova. Doesn’t have vital stats for 2009. Its overall population fell by five thousand people in 2009 relative to 2008, which is lower than usual, since on most years it falls by around ten thousand. I don’t think this was due to demographic improvements – don’t forget that many Moldovans were returning from their work in Russia during its recession in 2009.

Rest of post-Soviet space. Azerbaijan and Central Asia don’t need to be considered since they have healthy demographics anyway.

The Balkans. Birth rates and death rates seemed to have remained essentially stable from 2008 to 2009 in Bulgaria and Romania, with a slight improvement overall. Crisis hasn’t affected them much – at least, not yet.

Final conclusion – overall, the crisis did not greatly affect the demography of the Eurasian region. There continued to be modest improvements in the two most populous nations, Russia and Ukraine. The death rate has fallen rapidly during the crisis almost everywhere, the sole exceptions being Belarus and Romania where it increased by a tiny amount. On the other hand, birth rates have either risen slowly (e.g. Russia), stagnated (e.g. Ukraine), or fallen slowly (e.g. Estonia). The major exception is Latvia, where birth rates have collapsed at an amazing rate from regional average to “lowest-low”. This reflects the particular severity of the economic crash in Latvia.

* The real rise in the birth rate and the death rate from 2008 to 2009 are actually slightly exaggerated. That is because from 2009, Belarus lowered its total population (on the basis of which birth and death rates / 1000 people are calculated) to correlate with the preliminary results of the 2009 Census. The actual number of births rose from 107.9 thousand to 109.8 thousand and the number of deaths rose from 133.9 thousand to 135.0 thousand.

The audience to these exercises is obvious – Russia. The melting of the Arctic sea ice is opening up new hydrocarbon deposits and making polar trade routes increasingly viable. This is already unleashing a scramble for the Arctic on the part of nations like Russia, Canada, the US, China, Denmark, and Norway. Part of this new competition will overspill into the military sphere. These exercises are a good example of the geopolitical feedback loops that will constrain hydrocarbon extraction volumes below the level dictated by geology in the absence of political factors.

The bigger picture is that as the world’s hydrocarbon and mineral resources begin to run scarce, there will be more and more resource wars – of which Iraq 2003 was only the first and most prominent. In particular we can expect intensified China – West competition over Africa and the Middle East, and Russia – West competition over the Arctic and Caucasus.

2. Washington is locking down its influence over Romania, with an agreement to station GBI missiles in the country (the previous candidate, Poland, was abandoned, and given Patriot batteries and F-16′s instead). This follows on 1) Moldova’s tilt away from Moscow after the defeat of Voronin’s Communist Party in September 2009, in favor of Romania, and 2) Ukraine’s partial return into the Russian imperial fold. There are also American plans to position warships with Aegis/SM-3 in the Black Sea, ostensibly to protect Europe from Iranian IRBM’s.

Needless to say, Russia is none too happy about this. An expanded American presence in the Balkans may complicate any future intervention in the Caucasus, e.g. a renewed conflict with Georgia or helping Armenia should it be attacked by Azerbaijan. On the larger strategic level, just as Russia is reasserting its influence over core former-Soviet territories, a cordon sanitaire is being constructed around its reemerging empire (albeit this time much further to the east than the old Iron Curtain). Just this last week, the US Navy conducted exercises with the Georgian Navy and announced plans for flight training exercises in the Baltics later in the month.

Equally needless to say, at present Russia does not have any way of arresting Washington’s slow march back to containment. On the other hand, it does have the capability to undermine an increasingly fragile Pax Americana elsewhere. It can render meaningless any US sanctions on Iran’s gasoline imports, and it could even sell the Islamic regime the S-300 anti-aircraft system and information networking equipment, anti-ship cruise missiles, and sea mines that will enhance its chances of closing down the Strait of Hormuz to oil shipping in the case of war with the US.

This is not to imply that we are already plummeting into a new Cold War. But the foundations and trends for it are certainly there, and growing stronger.

3. Quick note on Ukraine. Yanukovych is now firmly entrenched as President of Ukraine, after Tymoshenko’s (loser of the recent elections) coalition government collapsed. Though he has made symbolic overtures to the West, such as visiting Brussels before Moscow, his actions indicate that Ukraine will be drawing a lot closer to Russia.

4. NATO is, of course, no longer near the monolithic anti-Soviet bloc it once was – not surprisingly, given the relative decline of its lynchpin. In particular, there are (very faint) allusions to the Franco-Russian alliance of 1892 in Medvedev’s Monday visit to Paris to talk with Sarkozy about 1) buying four Mistral C&C helicopter carriers, 2) the usual commercial deals, 3) more French participation in Russia’s gas industry, and 4) Russia’s proposed pan-European security treaty that would displace the old Cold War arrangements towards something closer to the even older Concert of Powers.

As usual, we must not overstate the short-term significance. France remains firmly entrenched within its alliances with Germany and the US, while Germany remains Russia’s primary European partners. Over the longer-term, things can change. Germany may soon start returning to sphere-of-influence-politics, while a post-collapse USA is likely to become dominated by isolationist tendencies. In this situation, stronger ties between France and Russia will be in both nations’ geopolitical interest.

5. Collapse of Pax Americana watch. See this Russia Today “Crosstalk” hosted by Peter Lavelle, in which the speakers compare the USSR in the late 1980′s and the US today.

As I have argued before, the similarites are many.

• USA 2009 = USSR 1989 ? (Sublime Oblivion)
• Closing the Collapse Gap / my synopsis of longer essay (Dmitry Orlov)

6. USA watch. Wall Street’s Bailout Hustle by Matt Taibbi details the scams being played by the investment banks on the taxpayers. Personally, I’d reserve more of the blame for the government. Bankers are supposed and expected to be greedy, politicians are the ones *supposed* to look out for their constituents. Barack O’Bush signs extension to the Patriot Act.

The crisis of the regions (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard) - just as Europe has its Latvias, Greeces, Spains, and Irelands, so the US has its Floridas, Arizonas, Michigans, New Jerseys, Pennsylvanias, and Californias.

The Economic Policy Institute says states face a shortfall of $156bn in fiscal 2010. Most are banned by law from running deficits, so they must retrench. Washington has provided $68bn in federal aid, but that depletes the Obama stimulus package.

7. In my last Sublime News #2, I explained my initial lack of mention of the Dubai assassination of a Hamas operative by Mossad was due to its lack of significance. This is not the case for the exposure of Israeli spy rings in Lebanon.

WITH a lot less exposure in the world’s press than it got for its recent Dubai operation, Israel has quietly suffered a string of setbacks in Lebanon, a front-line state with which it has often been at war. Lebanon’s security service says that since November 2008 it has broken up no fewer than 25 Israeli spy rings. The reported arrest this month of a colonel in Lebanese army intelligence, identified solely by the initials GS, brings the number of those charged to 70-plus; 40 of them are in Lebanese police custody. …

Aside from the alleged spies, the Lebanese say they netted fancy surveillance and communications gear disguised, among other innocuous things, as Thermos flasks, canisters of motor oil and battery chargers. The gadgetry may be what gave the game away. Security sources hint that France or perhaps Russia helped the Lebanese by supplying sophisticated systems to monitor and analyse the telecoms data. The Lebanese then homed in on suspicious signals.

Another clue may have pointed to the importance of the signals trail. Last summer, as the spies were being rounded up, a senior man in Unit 8200, the section of Israeli military intelligence tasked with eavesdropping on Israel’s enemies, shot himself in his office. Colleagues blamed “unrequited love”.

I noted back at the beginning of the year that there is a significant chance of a new Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2010. Since the same basic conditions are still in place (standoff with Iran, no prospect of successful sanctions), this severe blow to Israel’s intelligence assets in Lebanon will give Israel an added incentive to launch a demonstrative strike against Iran’s proxy in Lebanon.

8. More on Russia’s demography – the site Demoscope summarizes the demographic results of 2009 (in Russian).

9. The demographic armageddon that no neocon dare name (or: Poland is doomed!) by Mark Adomanis @ True Slant. He correctly points out the illogicality of harping on about how Russia’s demography will lead to its doom, while ignoring Poland‘s even direr straits. Nonetheless, I disagreed with him that Poland is the demographic sick man of Europe. Below is my first reply, which generated an ongoing conversation.

I don’t agree with you that Poland (or Russia) is necessarily worse off than Western Europe, or more precisely, the Teutonia (Germany / Austria) and the Med (Italy / Iberia / Greece) parts of Western Europe. (Obviously France, UK and Scandinavia are better off).

Both Poland’s and Russia’s fertility collapses occurred in the early 1990’s, and since the mid-2000’s both have seen an appreciable and accelerating rise in fertility (especially Russia). That is because women postponed having children during the unstable transition years, but are now beginning to have them in a race before it becomes physiologically impossible.

(Incidentally, I agree with you that Russia is better off than Poland. Not only is Russia’s real TFR now higher, but its desired TFR is higher (2.5 vs 2.1 for Poland), which makes me think that Russia will approach Scandinavian levels of TFR by 2015 (around 1.7-1.8) whereas Poland will remain stuck at 1.4-1.5.)

In comparison, in Teutonia in the early 1970’s and in the Med in the 1980’s, the TFR fell to below 1.5 and has remained stuck there ever since. This means that a generation has already passed, their current child-bearing generation is substantially smaller than the last one and as such they already have no hope of averting big natural population decrease.

So basically, the likes of Russia and Poland still have a “window” of 10 years to raise their TFR back up to sustainable levels. This window has already closed for Germany and Italy.

10. My work on Russia’s demography was publicized by Douglas Muir at A Fistful of Euros, who also described S/O as “an interesting, provocative labor of love” and a “macro-look at Russia with a side order of challenging speculation”. Well put and thanks!

11. I also got a pleasant surprise on discovering one of my posts is cited on Google Scholar, in the paper Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times by Philip A. Kuhn from November 2009.

12. Ed Hugh summarizes the world economy in The “Three Speed” Global Manufacturing Recovery Continues in February.

I’ll note that 1) the Asian region, as well as Brazil and South Africa, show fast manufacturing recovery and continue to decouple from the industrialized nations’ unwinding, and 2) as of now Russia looks its stuck in an L-shaped rut, so perhaps the 6.2% growth predicted by Citigroup for 2010 is too optimistic.

13. Energy blast. Faster than expected well inflation over Ghawa’s new developments. Perhaps we’ll nuke oil shale fields instead.

14. Climate blast. Lou Grinzo of the excellent Cost of Energy blog compiles the latest in AGW denier extremism. (This is an example of delayed reactions to overshoot, and of the neglected political factor in Limits to Growth whose importance should not be understated).

I’ve become convinced that we’re on a collision course, not just with devastating human impacts from climate change and peak oil, but also with acts of violence committed by the most militant and deluded of the climate change deniers. The bullying has reached astonishing levels, and as much as I would hate to see anyone on any side of this issue be physically harmed or “merely” intimidated, it’s undeniably true that intimidation is already happening and violence can’t be far off.

See also The Rise of Anti-Science Bullying.

Meanwhile, nature couldn’t care less about our affairs, least of all those of reality-deniers. Arctic seabed methane stores destabilizing, venting – this methane trigger is a potential feedback / tipping point that could catapult the climate system into the land of no return.

15. Tech blast. Progress in materials science thanks to development in quantum mechanics. Chickenosaurus: Canadian scientist says he can create dinosaurs from chickens – since we are so hell-bent on recreating Jurassic climatic conditions, might as well accompany it with the period-authentic megafauna. Skinput Turns Any Bodily Surface Into a Touch Interface.

16. War blast. Littoral warriors too pusillanimous to kick pirate ass. Under current plans India to acquire dominant armored force in Eurasia by 2020; not as useful as it sounds due to decreasing utility of tanks in 4GW. North Korea’s catabolic collapse continues. First S-400 battalion is deployed around Moscow.

Tomgram: William Astore, The U.S. Military’s German Fetish. I disagree with most of it.

17. Turkey watch. What’s Really Behind Turkey’s Coup Arrests? (Soner Cagaptay). Apparently, Islamist elements in Turkish politics are asserting supremacy over the secular military. I would appreciate if any Turks or Turkey-watchers could comment.

A mountain has moved in Turkish politics. All shots against the military are now fair game, including those below the belt. The force behind this dramatic change is the Fethullah Gülen Movement (FGH), an ultraconservative political faction that backs the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The FGH was founded in the 1970s by Fethullah Gülen, a charismatic preacher who now lives in the United States but remains popular in Turkey. It is a conservative movement aiming to reshape secular Turkey in its own image, by securing the supremacy of Gülen’s version of religion over politics, government, education, media, business, and public and personal life.

To some, it might appear that the newfound freedom to criticize the military proves that Turkey is becoming a more liberal democracy. But the truth is that Turkey has replaced one “untouchable” organization for another, more dangerous, one. Criticizing the Gülen movement, which controls the national police and its powerful domestic intelligence branch, and which exerts increasing influence in the judiciary, has become as taboo as assailing the military once was. Today, it is those who criticize the Gülen movement who get burned. …

Illegal wiretaps and arbitrary arrests serve to intimidate the public, not prosecute criminals. Because of Ergenekon, Turks who oppose the AKP and the Gülen movement fear to speak their minds freely. If you have doubts, call a friend in Turkey and ask for an opinion of the case. Your friend will respond with details of the weather.

The military, which opposes the AKP and the Gülenists because it sees itself as the virtual guardian of Turkey’s secular polity à la Ataturk’s vision, serving as a bulwark against religion’s domination over politics and government, has become the primary target of this round of politically motivated arrests. …

With the Gülen movement in control of large portions of the government apparatus and running a political witch hunt against its opponents through the Ergenekon case, Turkey is taking a dangerously authoritarian turn. A personal friend and politician from the former Soviet Union once said, “A police state emerges not when the police listen to all the citizens, but when all the citizens fear that they are being listened to.” Welcome to the new Turkey: If you listen carefully, you can hear the political ground shifting below your feet.

PS. I did ask a Turk over Facebook. He said “Ergenekon case is totally a lie and prisoners of this case are innocent” and “Turkish government and preacher named Fethullah Gülen are liar”.

18. China watch. See Question and Answer Session With Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi At Munich Security Conference (h/t Nikolas Gvosdev) for a summary of China’s views on the injustice of US arms sales to Taiwan, the Google affair, and Iran sanctions.

In other news, growth in Chinese military spending falls to 7.5% in 2010, or around 80bn $. As I frequently pointed out is the case for Russia and the US, real military spending is almost always substantially larger than the official figures, sometimes several times over. Taking into account the GDP deflater would provide a real military spending figure of twice that, i.e. 150-200bn $ (a valid adjustment since the bulk of Chinese military product is domestic), and adding in the normal black budgets, structural militarization, etc, will probably yield something in the region of 300-400bn $.

19. Brazil watch. A few months ago the Economist (world’s sleaziest magazine) had a long feature on Brazil takes off.

Now that scepticism looks misplaced. China may be leading the world economy out of recession but Brazil is also on a roll. It did not avoid the downturn, but was among the last in and the first out. Its economy is growing again at an annualised rate of 5%. It should pick up more speed over the next few years as big new deep-sea oilfields come on stream, and as Asian countries still hunger for food and minerals from Brazil’s vast and bountiful land.

Good so far. It’s newly-discovered offshore oil resources will be a boon in the post-peak oil world, as will its other natural riches.

And, in some ways, Brazil outclasses the other BRICs. Unlike China, it is a democracy. Unlike India, it has no insurgents, no ethnic and religious conflicts nor hostile neighbours. Unlike Russia, it exports more than oil and arms, and treats foreign investors with respect.

And the ideologizing begins by the third paragraph.

Just as it would be a mistake to underestimate the new Brazil, so it would be to gloss over its weaknesses. Some of these are depressingly familiar. Government spending is growing faster than the economy as a whole, but both private and public sectors still invest too little, planting a question-mark over those rosy growth forecasts. Too much public money is going on the wrong things. The federal government’s payroll has increased by 13% since September 2008. Social-security and pension spending rose by 7% over the same period although the population is relatively young. Despite recent improvements, education and infrastructure still lag behind China’s or South Korea’s (as a big power cut this week reminded Brazilians). In some parts of Brazil, violent crime is still rampant.

I’ve hi-lighted the fundamental reason why Brazil is very unlikely to become a developed nation within the foreseeable future, unlike east-central Europe, Russia or even China – …”in the 2006 PISA science assessment, only 15.2% of Brazilians possessed skills beyond those needed for purely linear problem-solving, compared with 47.6% of Russian and 51.3% of American students. A country needs to have sizeable cadres of skilled workers to move into added-value manufacturing or complex services. Brainier nations will also assimilate technology more easily and thus their economic “rate of convergence” to developed-world status will be that much faster.” Historically, education is the elixir of growth and the only nations to have truly “caught up” with the developed world in the past fifty years – Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, … – all had superior education systems.

Nevertheless, the country’s course seems to be set. Its take-off is all the more admirable because it has been achieved through reform and democratic consensus-building. If only China could say the same.

More irrelevant ideologizing. As I remember noting in one of my Tweets, the Economist is far more useful as a portal into the thinking processes of the Western neoliberal elites than as a source of objective analysis.

(Furthermore, Brazil isn’t even all that cuddly liberal).

20. This has been a productive week for observers of reality-disconnected Russophobes and their liberast lackeys.

First off the bat (and I do mean bat), Yulia Latynina, the one who thinks poor people shouldn’t vote. Her latest nuggets of wisdom / Ру. (h/t poemless):

I don’t like human rights, environmental activists or the Olympic Games. You might call me crazy for this belief. After all, these three things are beneficial to mankind, and most of their participants don’t make a lot of money.

Maybe I have been shaped by the fact that I was born in the Soviet Union, a country that was determined to bring peace and happiness to the whole world, and I’m a bit distrustful of these “do-gooders.” I prefer the guys who work for a profit, provided that the country is built in such a way that they contribute to the common good. …

And consider the environment issue. Millions of people are dying from environmental poisons, acids and heavy metals. Who could argue against the fight against pollution? But the Kyoto Protocol does not limit pollutants. It limits completely harmless CO2. The concentration of CO2 in the Jurassic or Devonian periods was from seven to 12 times greater than today. And this is precisely because CO2 is an integral part of the biosphere. It can also be the source of a lucrative trade in carbon quotas. …

The global bureaucracy wants to succeed where the Soviet Union has failed. It is anxious to help the poor and save the planet — not by discovering and making a profit, but by regulating and distributing.

Second, Masha Karp, gold medal winner for Russophobe cliche, with her KGB TV (sic) opus about Russia Today.

Despite the channel’s original name, things that are really happening in Russia today, such as the suppression of free speech and peaceful demonstrations, or the economic inefficiency and corrupt judiciary, are either ignored or their significance played down. Instead, the “Explore Russia” slot offers pretty pictures glorifying the country’s cuisine, arts and crafts and colourful history. …

… It is this complex image of Russia — claiming to share the West’s “ideology” but not subscribing to its values — that is tirelessly promoted by Russia Today, and also by Western PR agencies hired for this purpose, by selected foreign journalists invited to the Valdai Club, where they are wined, dined and fed the Russian perspective on the world, by foundations to promote Russian language and culture and by various less visible activities such as organising abusive postings on foreign newspaper websites. Of course, instead of spending a fortune on all this, the Kremlin could try and change the image of Russia just by changing its own ways. But that doesn’t seem very likely.

Reality check. Every serious nation spends resources on improving its international image – if anything, Russia was came fecklessly late to this game. No self-respecting nation karps on about its failings, real or imagined, much as their detractors might wish to the contrary.

Third, Russian Anti-Americanism: A Priority Target for U.S. Public Diplomacy by Ariel Cohen. Love the juxtaposition of the quasi-academic (quackademic?) layout and the litany of contradictions, unsupported assumptions, and meaningless beigeocratic blather in the content. One of Cohen’s suggestions:

Use public diplomacy strategically to counter the flood of anti-American propaganda from the highest levels of the Russian government. U.S. public diplomacy should focus on reaching ordinary Russians. These efforts should include international broadcasting, Internet campaigns, the launch of a new Russian satellite channel, Web 2.0 social networking, print media, and revamped academic, student, andbusiness exchange programs.

“Web 2.0 social networking”? Really? Why not full-immersion virtual reality interaction while you’re at it?

Cohen assumes that Russian disillusionment with the West came about because of the (mythical) Kremlin clampdown on information and propaganda. In reality, this is very unlikely to be the case since opinion polls show that it is the young, best-educated, and most Internet-savvy Russians – i.e., those who know the West best in Russia – who are also the most dismissive of the West’s superiority complex.

Fourth, as noted by A Good Treaty, neocon sports commentary is amazingly stupid. From the hallowed pages of the Wall Street Journal:

This thought runs against centuries of Russian tradition, but why not try to measure Russia’s greatness by its ability to build a free and prosperous country, a good global citizen at peace with its neighbors? This kind of Russia might also fare better at the Olympics. The four leading medals winners in Vancouver are free-market democracies.

Obviously East Germany was the most democratic nation in history. I mean, it even had the word “democratic” in its name!

21. More inanity from the WSJ. Free market fundamentalism saved Chile from earthquake apocalypse, as per intolerable hack Bret Stephens. Maybe not.

22. Mark Adomanis at True Slant is churning out a stunning, even prodigal, amount of quality output on Russia. Right now, he is on a Da Russophile-sque “myth-busting” roll, exposing the most incompetent Russia analysts / Russophobes (Stephen Blank, Leon Aron), attacking self-hating limp-wristed liberasts like Nemtsov, and defending the “Putin economic model” (at least for being better than the free-for-all 1990′s). A Good Treaty is another Russia blog off to an excellent start, with short and engaging posts on Stalin’s legacy, Latynina’s insanity, and meeting with Kozlovsky.

I wonder how long they’ll last. The frequent pattern I see with good new “Russophile” blogs goes something like the following: Week 1 = loads of well-written, passionate posts; Month 1 = enthuasism remains, output drops to normal; Year 1 = by now many of them get tired of commenting on the same topics, refuting the same myths, and making ridiculing the same cliches, and die of ennui. Examples: Fedia Kriukov, Konstantin, Kirill Pankratov, Moscow Tory, Parallax Brief. Even Da Russophile after a fashion – my blog is now Sublime Oblivion, and Russia is no longer it’s defining focus.

23. @ Russophones / Google Translate users, demography of late Soviet / RF Jewry in latest issue of Demoscope journal.

24. This should be S/O’s theme song.

25. Heroic Latvian hacker calling himself “Neo” steals tax records and exposes corruption in the super-Depressed Baltic state.

26. More humor:

• Pyongyang traffic girl.
• Pan-Turanian wet dream.
• What are your best naked stories?
• KungFu vs Yoga (h/t Dmitry Rogozin)
• Japan’s Hitler manga
• Если бы девушки были как мужчины

27. Religion watch. Catholic Church rehabilitates Marx, so please no more talk of godless commies. (h/t poemless)